Borborigmo

Siempre he creido importante que la investigación académica puede ayudarnos para entender un problema como la corrupción en un país signado por una historia donde el manejo de la cosa pública no ha sido ni es totalmente transparente.

Por eso utilizaré este post para compartir referencias a trabajos académicos recientes, documentos de trabajo o artículos publicados que ofrezcan pistas actualizadas que exploren la relación entre acceso al gobierno, corrupción y enriquecimiento tanto en países desarrollados como en países en desarrollo. Los trabajos serán incluidos porque ofrecen innovaciones metodológicas otros por sus aportes sustantivos. Actualizaré irregularmente los resúmenes y vínculos a los papers (si los hubiera).

Getting Rich(er) in Office? Corruption and Wealth Accumulation in Congress”

Gabriel Lenz y Kevin Lim, MIT Department of Political Science, Marzo 2009

Abstract:

How corrupt is Congress? We provide an indirect test by comparing wealth accumulation from 1995 to 2005 among members of the U.S. House of Representatives and members of the public. Data on representatives are from Personal Financial Disclosure forms and data on the public are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). To test whether representatives accumulate wealth at a faster rate than expected, we construct counterfactuals based on the PSID with two approaches. We first use statistical models, conditioning on asset distribution over stocks, bonds, businesses, and land, as well as demographic variables. These models find representatives accumulating wealth about 20 percent faster than expected. Second, we employ matching. Unlike the modeling approach, matching finds an almost identical rate of wealth accumulation among both groups. Further analysis reveals that matching reduces bias from several incorrect functional form assumptions in the statistical models. We thus conclude that representatives report accumulating wealth at a rate consistent with similar non-representatives, suggesting no aggregate corruption. Besides examining overall wealth accumulation, we also test for effects of committee assignments, safe seats, career trajectories, and campaign contributions.

The Value of Political Power: Estimating Returns to Office in Post-War British Politics

Eggers, Andy and Hainmueller, Jens, Septiembre, 2008.

Una versión previa de Marzo de 2008 está disponible en el Munich Personal RePEc Archive bajo el título: MPs for Sale? Estimating Returns to Office in Post-War British Politics

Abstract:

Many recent studies show that firms profit from connections to influential politicians, but less is known about how much politicians financially benefit from wielding political influence. We estimate the returns to serving in Parliament using original data on the estates of recently deceased British politicians. Applying both matching and a regression discontinuity design to compare MPs with parliamentary candidates who narrowly lost, we find that serving in office almost doubled the wealth of Conservative MPs but had no discernible financial benefits for Labour MPs. Conservative MPs profited from office largely through lucrative outside employment they acquired as a result of their political positions; we show that gaining a seat in Parliament increased the probability that a Conservative politician would later serve as a director of a publicly-traded firm. We suggest that Labour MPs did not profit from office largely because trade unions effectively monopolized the market for political services by controlling the party and its politicians. Our findings provide evidence relevant to a growing theoretical and empirical literature assessing the relationship between the financial rewards of political office and the quality of politicians.

Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance

Claudio Ferraz (PUC-Rio) y Frederico Finan (UCLA). Agosto 2008.

Nota: Las referencias a este paper y al siguiente las encontre en un post de Chris Blattman donde comenta brevemente el trabajo de los autores.

Abstract:

Recent studies have emphasized the importance of the quality of politicians for good gov-
ernment and consequently economic performance. But if the quality of leadership matters, then
understanding what motivates individuals to become politicians and perform competently in of-
fice becomes a central question. In this paper, we examine whether higher wages attract better
quality politicians and improve political performance using exogenous variation in the salaries of
local legislators across Brazil’s municipal governments. The analysis exploits discontinuities in
wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional amendment defining caps on the salary
of local legislatures according to municipal population. Our main findings show that higher
wages increases political competition and improves the quality of legislators, as measured by
education, type of previous profession, and political experience in office. In addition to this
positive selection, we find that wages also affect politicians’ performance, which is consistent
with a behavioral response to a higher value of holding office.

Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments

Claudio Ferraz (PUC-Rio) y Frederico Finan (UCLA). Setiembre 2008.

Comentado por Chris Blattman en su blog.

Abstract:

Political corruption is a concern of many modern democracies. It weakens democratic insti-
tutions, restricts public services, and lowers productivity undermining economic development.
Yet despite its importance, we know little about its causes. We construct new measures of
political corruption in local governments using audit reports from an anti-corruption program
in Brazil. We apply these objective measures of corruption to test whether the possibility of re-
election affects the level of rents extracted by incumbent politicians. Our analysis confirms that
there is significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get re-elected. May-
ors with re-election incentives misappropriate 27 percent less resources than mayors without
re-election incentives. We also present evidence that these effects are more pronounced among
municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is
lower. Overall these findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability
play a crucial role in constraining politician’s corrupt behavior.

The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution

Keith Darden, Politics and Society, Vol. 36, No.1 35-59, 2008

Abstract:

This article argues that corrupt practices such as bribery and embezzlement, which scholars have previously assumed to be evidence of the breakdown of the state, may reinforce the state’s administrative hierarchies under certain conditions. Drawing on a cross-national analysis of 132 countries and a detailed examination of the informal institutions of official graft in Ukraine, the article finds that where graft is systematically tracked, monitored, and granted by state leaders as an informal payment in exchange for compliance, it provides both an added incentive to obey leaders’ directives and the potent sanction of criminal prosecution in the event of disobedience. Where graft is informally institutionalized in this way, it provides the basis for state organizations that are effective at collecting taxes, maintaining public order, and repressing political opposition but that may undermine the development of liberal politics.

Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes

Claudio Ferraz (PUC-Rio) y Frederico Finan (UCLA). Junio 2007.

Abstract:

This paper examines whether access to information enhances political accountability. Based upon the results of Brazil’s recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the effects of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors. Comparing municipalities audited before and after the elections, we show that the audit policy reduced the incumbent’s likelihood of re-election by approximately 20 percent, and was more pronounced in municipalities with radio stations. These findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process.